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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA H. JENSEN,
Petitioner/Appellant,
No. 990465-CA
vs.
JAMES T. JENSEN,

Argument Priority 15

Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
Linda H. Jensen ("Wife") appeals a final Supplemental Decree of Divorce entered by
the district court on January 19, 1999. This court's jurisdiction is based upon Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Husband, a lawyer, transferred certain Zions Bank stock he received as a gift

to himself and Wife as joint tenants in 1986. Did the trial court err in nevertheless holding
the stock to be husband's separate property, based upon Husband's alleged subjective intent
that he did not really mean to make Wife an equal owner of the stock? This issue presents
a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P .2d 1065
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). This issue was preserved at R. 120-21.

2.

Did the trial court err in awarding all of the parties' interest in significant

ranching operations to Husband, even though the parties both enhanced the value of those
operations through marital funds and their joint efforts during the maiTiage? This issue is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App.
1991 ). This issue was preserved at R. 111-19.
GOVERNING LAW
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose
interpretation is determinative or of central importance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case, Course ofProceedings and Disposition Below.

The parties were married July 30, 1970. Wife filed a complaint for divorce on February 16, 1996. (R. 1-4.) The trial was held October 28-30, 1997, and November 12, 1997.
Over a year later, the court issued its Memorandum Decision, Supplemental Findings of Fact
and Conclusions ofLaw, and Supplemental Decree ofDivorce on January 19, 1999, in which
the court determined that, after a twenty-seven year marriage, the bulk of the parties' estate
consisted ofHusband's separate property. (R. 196-246.) Husband timely filed Objections
to Supplemental Findings of Fact, Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Motion to Amend and
Request for Oral Argument pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 on January 29, 1999.
(R. 247-52.) This motion was denied by order entered April14, 1999. (R. 296-99.) The
notice of appeal was filed May 13, 1999. (R. 300-02.)
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B.

Statement of Facts.

James T. Jensen ("Husband") and Linda H. Jensen ("Wife") were married in 1970 in
Utah and had three children during the marriage, two of whom had reached the age of majority at the time of trial, and the other of whom was still in high school. (R. 1-2, R. 323 at
pp. 5, 12-13.)
Wife was fifty-one years old at the time of trial. She attended college for three years
before the marriage but upon Husband's request did not work outside the home during most
of the parties' marriage. (R. 323 at pp. 6, 29, 120.) Husband explained that he did not want
Wife to work during the marriage so they could spend more time together. (R. 324 at p. 195.)
In accord with his wishes, instead of working outside the home, Wife focused on maintaining
the parties' domestic affairs and caring for their children. (R. 109; R. 323 at pp. 44-45.) The
only exception to this is that she worked part-time from 1985 to 1990 at Husband's law
office performing clerical work. (R. 323 at pp. 43, 89; R. 324 at pp. 196-97.)
Husband was fifty seven years old at the time of trial. He was admitted to the Utah
State Bar in 1969. (R. 323 at p. 136.) He practiced law with his father, Therald Jensen, in
Price, Utah, unti11990, when he became in-house counsel for Savage Industries. (R. 323 at
pp. 7, 45.) He is currently Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Savage
Industries. (R. 221.) Husband was a new attorney when the parties were married, and Wife's
father gave Husband "quite a bit ofbusiness" in the early 1980's by introducing Husband to
contacts in the mining industry. (R. 323 at pp. 26, 117.)
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Over the course of the twenty-seven-year marriage, the parties acquired substantial
assets and maintained a high standard ofliving. (R. 109; R. 323 at pp. 55-57.) They received
property and other assets, through gift or inheritance, from each of their parents. (R. 109.)
Wife's father gave the parties the land on which their first home was built, 1 and Husband's
father was the source of some of the ranch properties and part of the bank stock that is at
issue on appeal. (R. 323 at pp. 37-38). These assets were commingled between the parties.
Wife is contesting the court's award of two assets: 58,352 shares of Zions Bank stock, and
the ranching operations (consisting ofT-N Company, T-N Ranches, and the Moynier Ranch).
The court awarded the Zions Bank stock and the ranching operations to Husband as separate
property. Wife contends that all of the Zions Bank stock and the parties' interest in the
ranching operations was marital property and should have been equally divided.
1.

Zions Bank Stock.

The parties owned 88,493 shares of Zions Bank stock as joint tt~nants at the time of
trial? (Defendant's Exhibit 20.) The initial shares of stock were obtained in 1973, when
Zions Bank purchased Carbon/Emery Bank in a stock exchange, and Husband's premarital
shares of Carbon/Emery Bank were converted to 2,616 shares of Zions stock. After taking

The home was in Spring Glen, Utah, and the parties jointly held title to the land and
home. The parties divided the proceeds from the sale of the home equally. (R. 323 at pp. 3738).
1

2 Husband requested

in October 1997 that Zions Bank verify the number of shares held
by the parties. Zions Bank confirmed that as of October 9, 1997, there were 86, 172 shares
held by the parties as joint tenants, and that the parties had recently received an additional
2,321 shares through a dividend reinvestment program that was held in book entry form.
(Defendant's Exhibit 20).
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into account subsequent sales, those shares eventually grew, through stock splits and dividend reinvestment, to 58,352 shares at the time of trial. Husband conceded that the
remaining 30,141 shares of Zions Bank stock were marital property; Husband's mother gifted
approximately 10,066 shares to the parties during their marriage, and the parties purchased
additional shares, and these shares had grown to 30,141 shares at the time of the divorce.
(R. 325 at p. 87.) He contended, and the trial court held, that the remaining 58,352 shares
were Husband's separate property. (R. 207-08).
In 1985, Wife asked Husband if he would agree to put both oftheir names on all
shares of stock as joint tenants "and he didn't have a problem with that. It was done. Before
I even really realized it. And I felt at that point it wasn't an issue with him, or he wouldn't
have done it ...." (R. 157; R. 323 at p. 64.) She testified that she asked to convert all shares
to joint tenancy for two reasons: because she wanted some financial security if he died, and
because she felt they "were working for everything together" in their marriage. (R. 323 at
pp. 127-28.)
On the other hand, Husband claimed he only put Wife's name on the stock certificates
as a joint tenant because he "got tired" of discussing the matter with her. (R. 324 at p. 215.)
He contended that he did not intend to give Wife a present interest in the stock, but only intended to avoid probate. He conceded at trial that the stock certificates gave her a present
interest in the stock, but contended he did not really intend that they would divide the shares
equally if they divorced. (R. 324 at p. 216.) He never informed her of his secret intent not
to transfer a present interest, nor did he suggest that she consult with a lawyer when he put
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her name on the stock certificates. (R. 325 at pp. 85-87.) Husband admitted that he could
have legally put the stock in a trust that would have given all shares to Wife in the event of
death but no shares in the event of divorce. (R. 325 at p. 86.) He further admitted that his
father had an active probate law practice at the time and would have known how to achieve
this. (R. 324 at p. 192.) Finally, the parties treated the stock as a marital asset during the
marriage; they jointly paid taxes on dividends that were reinvested (Defendant's Exhibit 4;
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5), and received dividends periodically from the stock and used them to
pay family expenses. (R. 323 at p. 65.)
The value of the 88,493 shares was $2,491,090, and Wife proposed that she be
awarded half of the shares, or 44,247 shares. (R. 42, 109.) Instead, the court awarded her
one-half ofthe 30,141 shares that Husband conceded were marital propetty, or 15,071 shares.
(R. 207-08.) As for the remaining shares acquired during the marriage, the court stated that

there was "no evidence adduced at the trial of any donative intent" in the 1985 transfer, and
thus awarded those shares to Husband as his separate property. (R. 231.)
2.

The Ranching Operations.

The ranching operations consist of three distinct but inextricably related assets. T-N
Ranches and Moynier are essentially land-holding entities. T-N Ranches is a partnership
owned by Husband and his three siblings; it owns some 35,000 acres of land in Carbon
County, Utah, along with associated water rights and grazing permits. (R. 119; R. 323 at p.
164; Defendant's Exhibit 39; Plaintiff's Exhibit 11.) The Moynier property consists of
21,400 acres of land in Carbon, Duchesne and Utah Counties, together with state and federal
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grazing permits covering some 100,000 acres of land, title to which is in the name of
Husband and his two brothers. (R. 323 at pp. 157-62; R. 324 at pp. 180-81; Defendant's
Exhibits 28 and 30.) T-N Company a partnership also owned by Husband and his two
brothers, and it is the operating entity for the ranching property, owning cattle, equipment,
and machinery associated with the ranch. (R. 323 at pp. 148-49.) T-N Company leases the
entire 35,000 acres T-N Ranches landholding from T-N Ranches and the Moynier property
for a nominal sum of$1,000 per year. (R. 323 at p. 168.)
In support ofhis claim that Wife was not entitled to any portion of T-N Company or
T-N Ranches, Husband offered evidence that Wife has never owned an equity interest in
them in her own name and alleged that she only rarely worked on the ranches. (R. 326 at
p. 31.) Initially, Judge Young discounted these facts, acknowledging that "there is an overall
family environment that is being conducted and created and she's rendering contributions to
that, allowing him to render contributions to the other ...." (R. 326 at p. 32.) The court also
noted that the fact Husband worked for free for the ranching operations over a period of
several years weighed in Wife's favor, since his contributions to the ranching operations took
time away from their marriage but benefited the ranching operations. (R. 326 at pp. 35-36.)
Nonetheless, the court ultimately did not award her any interest in the ranch property.
(R. 227.)
(

The trial court determined that T-N Company and T-N Ranches were "inherited
property" and awarded the entire interest in T-N Company and T-N Ranches to Husband.
(R. 227.) The court based its determination on testimony that Therald Jensen had acquired
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the land throughout his lifetime, then gifted it over time to his children in order to fulfill a
dream of giving away his estate to his children before he died. (R. 222.) The court
additionally expressed concern that if he awarded Wife half of Husband's share in T-N
Ranches or T-N Company, it would create too small of a minority interest in a closely-held
corporation. (R. 326 at pp. 15-16.)
Regarding the Moynier property, the trial court apparently believ1~d that it was Wife's
burden to prove that the property was paid for with marital funds, in the absence of evidence
that separate funds were used to acquire it. (R. 223-24.) Even though the court found that
part of the down-payment came from marital funds and that the installment payments came
from income earned in the ranching operation during the marriage, the court concluded that
it was "equitable" that the entire property be considered Husband's separate property. (R.
223-24.)
Although the ranching properties constitute a single enterprise, the ownership and
background of each entity is somewhat unique, and so they are discussed separately below.
Husband and his two brothers are presently involved in a partition lawsuit regarding all of
the ranching properties. (Defendant's Exhibit 44.)
A.

T-N Company.

T-N Company was formed in 1969 by Husband's father, Therald Jensen, and his three
sons James, Butch and Jerry. (R. 78.) It initially owned construction equipment and cattle.
(R. 323 at pp. 7, 35.) T-N Company still operates as a cattle business, but in 1997 much of
the construction equipment was sold for $900,000. (R. 323 at p. 149.) Out of the remaining
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assets of T-N Company, the remaining equipment is worth approximately $600,000, and the
remaining cattle and other livestock are worth approximately $1.1 million. (R. 323 at
pp. 150-53.) T-N Company also owns several trucks and trailers and a shop building.
(R. 325 at 18; Defendant's Exhibit 12.)
Throughout the course of the parties' marriage, Husband has maintained the books
of T-N Company and T-N Ranches, made most major decisions with regard to the company,
and worked most weekends on matters related to T-N Company and/or T-N Ranches.
(R. 323 at p. 35; R. 324 at pp. 193-94; R. 325.) Wife testified that Husband "worked five
days a week in the office, and ... most of the weekend was spen[t] working at the ranch."
(R. 323 at p. 35). He often participated in construction projects on the land, operating the
heavy machinery and doing "whatever needed to be done." (R. 323 at p. 36).
The parties' testimony as to the amount of time Wife spent specifically on the
ranching operations differed; Wife testified that she "often" accompanied Husband to the
ranch properties on weekends and performed cooking and maintenance duties, and Husband
claimed she only worked on the ranches ten times at most toward the end of the marriage.
(R. 81; R. 323 at pp. 119-20.) Nonetheless, it is undisputed that while Husband was working
on the ranching operations, Wife was tending to the family's needs. 3 (R. 109.)

Husband argued that Wife is not entitled to any portion of the ranching operations
because she did not "support" him in his ranching efforts. (R. 81.) While it is true she was
opposed to the fact that he spent so much time on the ranches that he spent little with her and
their children, she was "supporting" the family while he was away at the ranches by raising
the children, paying bills, etc.
3
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According to the tax returns and equity accounts for T-N Company, Husband owns
49.29% of the company, and his two brothers own the remainder in e:qual shares. (R. 79;
R. 324 at pp. 22-24, 80.) However, Husband claims the brothers made an oral "agreement"
at some point that they each really own one-third of the company. (R. 324 at p. 108.) His
two brothers receive yearly salaries from T-N Company, yet Husband has never drawn a
salary from T-N Company, even though he spent as much time on the ranching operations
as they did throughout the parties' marriage. (R. 323 at pp. 126, 148; R. 324 at pp. 199-202.)
He also performed free legal work for T-N Company. (R. 324 at p. 202.)
Over the years, T-N Company required major cash subsidy in order to continue
operating. In the early years, that subsidy came from Husband's father, who loaned a significant amount to T-N Company in exchange for promissory notes from tht! company. (R. 325
at pp. 87-88). Husband's father later gifted his interest in the promissory notes separately to
Husband and Wife in $10,000 annual increments each as part of his estate planning. (R. 325
at pp. 87-88). By 1993, T-N Company owed Husband $126,931 and Wife $30,000. (R. 324
at p. 51). It owed Husband's law office $78,348. (R. 324 at p. 51.) It also owed $85,031 to
Malpaso, a trucking company which was formed during the marriage and which was for that
reason clearly a marital asset even though the stock was in Husband's name. (R. 323 at
pp. 34-35, 174-75.) The funds Malpaso and Wife lent to T-N Company were used to purchase heavy machinery for T-N Company, which machinery was then used as collateral by
the company to secure financing for additional growth and development. (R. 118.) In
addition, Malpaso, a marital asset, was completely absorbed into T-N Company.
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In 1993, the debts described above were converted into equity in T-N Company.
(R. 324 at pp. 51-53; R. 325 at pp. 87-88.) This equity was shown as part of Husband's
capital in the company although it is undisputed that a portion of that equity came from
marital property (Malpaso) and a portion came from Wife's separate interest in the
promissory notes.
The trial court failed to account for the $30,000 owed to Wife directly or for any
portion of the $85,031 owed to Malpaso. Furthermore, in early 1996, the parties sold
$65,000 ofthe Zions Bank stock they held as joint tenants and transferred the proceeds into
T-N Company. (R. 323 at pp. 66, 81-82; R. 325 at p. 48; Plaintiffs Exhibit 7.) Again, the
trial court failed to account for Wife's portion of this contribution into T-N Company.
The parties presented different values for T-N Company at trial. According to Wife's
expert Deane Smith, T-N Company is worth $2.2 million, and Husband's 49.29% share is
worth $1,066,000. (R. 323 at p. 132; R. 324 at p. 23.) Husband's expert Derk Rasmussen
valued T-N Company at $1.4 million. (R. 324 at pp. 140- 41.) The trial court did not resolve
the valuation issue.
B.

T-N Ranches.

T-N Ranches is a corporate entity formed in 1983. It owns the title to the ranch
property and grazing permits T-N Company uses at a token rental. (R. 323 at pp. 7, 166,
168.) Husband has acted as T-N Ranches' principal attorney since 1992, after his father's
death. (R. 325 at p. 82.) In 1988, Husband and Wife jointly gifted an 8.38% ownership
interest in T-N Ranches to Husband's two brothers and his sister. (R. 324 at pp. 24, 50;
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R. 325 at p. 85; Plaintiffs Exhibit 12.) This left each of the four siblings owning 3.53% of
T-N Ranches. T-N Company held the remainder. Upon Therald Jensen's death in 1992, the
shares were reallocated, leaving each sibling with 25% of T-N Ranches. (R. 222; R. 324 at
p. 50.) Although the 1988 gift to Husband's siblings was made by Husb~md and Wife as joint
owners, Husband contended at trial that the interest was his sole and Sl:!parate property.
T-N Company leases over 35,000 acres of land, plus grazing permits, from T-N
Ranches and the Moynier property at the reduced rate of $1,000 per year for the entire
property, which works out to 1.8 cents per acre for the owned property and nothing for the
leases and permits. (R. 323 at p. 168.) Wife's expert valued the parties' 25% interest in T-N
Ranches at $1,312,500. (R. 323 at pp. 11, 164; R. 324 at pp. 32-33.) Husband's expert
valued the parties' interest in T-N Ranches at $127,208, prior to application of an alleged
minority interest discount. (R. 324 at pp. 131-32, 152-56.) The trial court did not resolve
the valuation issue.
C.

The Moynier Ranch.

The Moynier Ranch consists of 21,400 deeded acres of ram;h land in Carbon,
Duchesne and Utah Counties, as well as over 100,000 acres of federal anci state grazing
permits. (R. 323 at pp. 157-62; R. 324 at pp. 180-81; Defendant's Exhibit 30) It was
acquired in 1976, well into the marriage, for approximately $827,000. The $25,000 down
payment came from the parties' marital funds. (R. 82; R. 224.) The court found that the
installment payments, were "paid for through the ranching operations or T.N. Company."
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(R. 223.) Husband admitted that $148,000 of the purchase price did not come from sales or
exchanges of separate property. (R. 323 at p. 182.)
Husband would not express an opinion on the value of the Moynier Ranch, but his
expert valued the parties' one-third interest at $333,679. (R. 323 at p. 173; R. 324 at p. 126.)
The expert's opinion was based on an estimate from a real estate appraiser, Sam Sanders,
whose wife works for Husband at Savage Industries. (R. 325 at p. 96.) However, the Utah
County Assessor valued the Utah County portion of the Moynier property alone at
$3,370,000, and Husband did not protest this valuation. (R. 324 at p. 181; R. 325 at p. 84.)
Wife's expert valued the Moynier Ranch at $5,375,000, and the parties' one-third interest at
$1,791,667. (R. 324 at p. 35.) The trial court did not resolve the valuation dispute.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Utah law, separate property becomes part of the marital estate when it has been
gifted to the other spouse; or when it has been consumed or commingled with marital property to the extent that its separate character can no longer be identified; or when the other
spouse has contributed to its enhancement, maintenance, or protection.
Husband placed his interest in the Zions Bank stock in joint tenancy in 1985. The law
presumes a transfer of a present interest, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
both parties intended the transaction to have some other effect. In this case, the court based
its decision on Husband's testimony that he did not intend to transfer a present interest to his
wife. Wife, however, was not informed of Husband's secret intent. In the light of the
fiduciary duty owed by spouses to each other, and given the undisputed evidence that Wife
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did not share Husband's secret intent, the legal standard for avoiding the transfer into joint
tenancy was not met.
The ranch properties became marital property because of commingling and augmentation during the marriage. Moynier, which was valued between $333,679 and $1,791,667,
was purchased after the marriage with funds earned by the parties and, in part, by the ranching operation. It subsidized the ranch operation by leasing its landholdings and grazing permits to the ranch operation for a nominal sum for many years. In addition, the ranch
converted a $30,000 promissory note owed to Wife and a $85,031 note owed to a marital
entity into "equity." At least $78,000 of Husband's earnings from practicing law during the
marriage were also invested in the ranch operation, as were the proceeds of sale of 1,837
shares of jointly owned Zions Bank stock. Finally, Husband devoted extraordinary hours
without compensation to the ranch operation. That investment of time could not have
occurred without Wife's contribution in maintaining the affairs of the family. The trial court
erred in failing to account for Wife's substantial financial

investmc~nt

in the ranching

operation, and in failing to find that the ranch operation had become marital property.
ARGUMENT
"Marital property is ordinarily all property acquired during marriage and it encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Marital property includes accounts receivable, tangible assets, and good will of a professional
practice, all products of labor of one spouse. See id. "[A]ccumulations resulting from a
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combination of the use of separate property of a spouse with the labor, skill and industry of
one or both of the members of the community should be equitably divided between the two."

Portillo v. Shappie, 636 P.2d 878, 879 (N.M. 1981); see also Barkley v. Barkley, 119 Ohio
App. 3d 155, 694 N.E.2d 989, 995 (1997) (marital property specifically includes "all income
and appreciation on separate property due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind contribution of
either of the spouses that occurred during the marriage"). The use of marital funds and
efforts to maintain and augment an asset support a finding that the appreciation of separate
property is marital in character. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).
In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court
explained that property acquired by one spouse either by gift or inheritance becomes a part
of the marital estate if"(l) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed
to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein
to the other spouse." 760 P.2d at 308. There is a presumption that property acquired during
the marriage is marital property. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P .2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). Although Utah case law is not entirely clear or consistent on the point, the characterization of property as marital or separate should be based upon the factors set forth in

Mortensen, not upon general equitable considerations, and equity should be invoked only in
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extraordinary circumstances. See id.; see generally Dolowitz, The Conundrum ofGifted,

Inherited and Premarital Property in Divorce, 11 (Apr.) Utah B.J. 16 (1998).
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD WIFE ONEHALF OF THE ZIONS BANK STOCK.

When the sole owner of property creates a joint tenancy in that property, a valid and
enforceable interest is created in the new joint owner. In 1985, Husband transferred
separately owned shares of stock in Zions Bank to himself and Wife as joint tenants. As a
result, each party received a one-half ownership interest in the stock with full rights of
survivorship. 4 McCoullough v. Wasserback, 30 Utah 2d 398, 518 P.2d 691, 693 (1974).
Husband now claims that his intention in creating joint ownership ofthe stock was not to
transfer a present interest to Wife, but to avoid probate.
In Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P.2d 327 (1941), the Utah Supreme Court
adopted the rule that a transfer of property into joint tenancy creates a pn:sumption of present
joint ownership that can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
In that case, the defendant's former wife sued him for past due child support. The defendant
had since remarried. His new wife had received $1,000 from her deceased husband's estate,
and she and her new husband had deposited the funds in a joint bank account. Both of them
testified that their intent was to avoid probate and that they had no intention of creating a
present interest in the husband which would be reachable by his creditors, including his

Had Husband predeceased this action, Wife would have undeniably received sole
title to the stock and to other assets described herein which were owned jointly by Wife and
Husband.
4
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former wife. The Supreme Court upheld a judgment in favor of the former wife against the
funds, holding that the parties' statements of their intention were insufficient to satisfy the
requirement of clear and convincing proof:
The only evidence refuting the implied joint savings account in the instant case
was that of the testimony of the codepositors to the effect that their purpose in
establishing the joint savings account was to take advantage of the survivorship
provision, and that the money was intended to be the sole and separate property of the
intervener. Such proof under the circumstances of this case cannot be termed so clear
and convincing as to require the trial court to find in favor of appellant. To say that
it was sufficient would throw open the door to fraud and collusion as between
codepositors and third parties. This equity will not do.
120 P.2d at 331. Accord, Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571,212 P.2d 194, 199 (1949) (in
a divorce case, court held that to overcome the presumption, clear and convincing proof must
be presented that both parties intended that no present interest be created).
More recent cases continue this view. In Estate ofAshton v. Ashton, 898 P.2d 824,
826 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the court explained that when title to property is held in joint
tenancy, "a rebuttable presumption arises that the title holders intended to create a valid joint
tenancy." This presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of
either fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity. Continental Bank and Trust, Co. v.
Kimball, 21 Utah 2d 152, 442 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1968). Absent such evidence, the parties

are bound by the joint tenancy and "cannot show that a result was intended contrary to that
which the law of joint tenancy relationship imposes." !d.; see also McCullough, 518 P.2d
at 694 (upholding ownership right of surviving joint tenant despite evidence that joint
ownership was not intended to create rights in survivor, but was "solely for convenience").
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In this case, Husband's evidence utterly fails to establish that both parties intended the
transfer to be effective only in the event of Husband's death. Husband.,s only evidence that
no present interest was intended was his own self-serving statement made years after the fact
that he intended to avoid probate but did not intend a present transfi!r. He presented no
contemporaneous evidence to corroborate his claim. He testified that his secret intent was
not communicated to or shared by Wife, and she testified that her understanding was that it
was done because they were both working together in the marriage, with joint tenancy chosen
because of the additional advantages of the survivorship rule. That evidence does not satisfy
the mutual intent requirement of Greener that evidence of intent contrary to the joint ownership presumption must be clear and convincing evidence of mutual intent.
It also is generally accepted in other jurisdictions that a unilateral intent not to convey

a present interest does not overcome the presumption.
The well established rule in Arizona is that a presumed gift occurs when one spouse
places his separate real property in joint tenancy with the other spouse and that this
presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidt~nce to the contrary.
This presumed gift cannot be overcome simply by husband's aft~~r-the-fact testimony
that the property was placed in joint tenancy only as a means of avoiding probate and
not as an intended gift.

Valladee v. Valladee, 149 Ariz. 304, 718 P.2d 206, 209 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1986).
[T]he presumption created by the [joint tenancy] deed cannot be overcome by
testimony of the hidden intentions of one of the parties, but only by evidence tending
to prove a common understanding or an agreement that the character of the property
was to be other than joint tenancy. Since there was no evidence of a common understanding or an agreement the presumption was not overcome.

Machado v. Machado, 58 Cal.2d 501, 25 Cal. Rptr. 87, 375 P.2d 55, 58 (1962). Accord,
Sloane v. Sloane, 132 Ariz. 414, 646 P.2d 299, 300 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1982) ("Can the hid-18-

den intention of one of the parties negate the presumption? We think not."); Hart v. Hart,
377 So.2d 51, 53 (Fla. App. 1979).
Moreover, in this case Husband transferred the shares while keeping his secret
intention hidden from his own wife. In dealing with her, Husband owed a fiduciary duty of
good faith. Madsonia Realty Co. v. Zion's Bank and Trust Co. (In re Madsen's Estate), 123
Utah 2d 327, 259 P.2d 595 (1953) ("[A] husband owes to his wife a high degree of good
faith, and ... husband and wife occupy a relation of special trust and confidence, and when
such relationship is abused, equity will intervene to right the wrong"); Glover v. Glover, 121
Utah 2d 362,242 P.2d 298, 300 (1952) ("There is no rule oflaw more firmly established than
that which holds that transactions between persons occupying fiduciary or confidential
relations with each other, in which the stronger or superior party obtains an advantage over
the other, cannot be upheld"); Smith v. Smith, 860 P.2d 634, 643 (Idaho 1993); In re
Marriage ofModnick, 33 CalJd 897, 191 Cal. Rptr. 629, 663 P.2d 187, 191 (1983).
In this case, Husband's status as an attorney heightens the level of scrutiny appropriately applied to the transaction. In Marshall v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 273 S.E.2d 360
(1980), for example, the husband, who was also a lawyer, pressured his emotionally unstable
wife to convey jointly-owned stock to himself prior to a reconciliation which lasted only for
a short period of time. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that "the
general rule is that where persons occupy a fiduciary or confidential relationship the lack of
independent advice on the part of the person who claims to be disadvantaged by the transaction may be a significant factor in court's evaluation of the overall bona fides of the trans-
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action. Here the problem is made more acute by the husband being an attorney." 273 S.E.2d
at 362-63.
Judge Young ignored the transfer into joint tenancy because he found that Husband
lacked donative intent in placing the property in joint tenancy. Husband's subjective intent,
however, is irrelevant. The transfer can only be ignored if both parties lacked the intent to
create a present interest.
Where, however, the parties have entered into and expressed in writing a
complete agreement which is clear as to the intent and purpose of the deposit, the
intent so expressed will be given effect unless the instrument is successfully attacked
for fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity, or unless it is shown by "clear and
convincing proof' that the parties intended the instrument to have a different effect
from that expressed.
Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194, 199 (1949). See also Neill v. Royce, 101

Utah 181, 120 P.2d 327. In this case, there was no evidence or finding that Wife did not
intend to create a present interest, and the record provides no basis for such a finding.
Moreover, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to its analysis. When the correct
legal standard is applied, the evidence fails as a matter of law to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the Zion's Bank stock is not part of the marital estate. See Bushell

v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1982) (including in marital estate fourteen acres ofland
given to husband by his father); Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Utah
1973) (including in marital estate money resulting from investment of gifts to wife from her
relatives); Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P .2d 928, 929 (1968) (including in marital
estate shares of stock given to husband by his father and sister).
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INCLUDE THE
PARTIES' INTEREST IN THE RANCH PROPERTIES IN THE
MARITAL ESTATE.
A.

All of the Ranch Properties Should Have Been Included in the
Marital Estate Because They Were Commingled with Marital
Assets and Enhanced by the Parties' Joint Efforts.

Separate property becomes part of the marital estate when "the property has been
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or [other] exchanges," and where the
other spouse has through his or her efforts "contributed to its enhancement, maintenance, or
protection." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). Here, not only have
commingled marital funds been used to maintain T-N Company, but Husband's ability to
invest time and effort into T-N Company during the marriage came at the expense of time
devoted to his family or his law practice, and was made possible by Wife's domestic contributions in managing household affairs and caring for the parties' children.
There was undisputed evidence that marital funds and property had been used to
maintain and enhance the ranch properties. The $30,000 promissory note T-N Company
owed to Wife was not paid, and was instead converted into equity in T-N Company. Wife's
one-half interest in Malpaso (the trucking company), including but not limited to the $85,031
promissory note that funded T-N Company equipment purchases, was also absorbed into T-N
Company. In addition, over the course ofthe parties' marriage, Husband invested significant
portions ofhis income from the practice oflaw, at least $78,000 into T-N Company. (R. 323
at p. 126; R. 324 at p. 51.) The Moynier property, which was acquired with marital funds,
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was leased to the ranching operation at nominal value, and thus was used to subsidize the
ranching operation at the expense of income that could have been earned in the marketplace.
Furthermore, 1,83 7 shares of stock in Zions Bank, owned jointly by both parties, were
sold in 1996. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 7; Defendant's Exhibit 20; R. 323 at pp. 81-82.) The
proceeds from this sale were used to purchase machinery for T-N Company and to finance
its operations.
In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1994), the court held that
a portion of the husband's business property, which was initially paid for by funds the
husband inherited, was properly included as a marital asset. The court explained that "[e ]ven
though the husband used inherited funds to pay the down payment on the building, he used
substantial marital funds to maintain and augment that asset. We find no error in the determination that the appreciated portion of the asset changed its character from a personal asset
to a marital asset." 875 P.2d at 602-03.
In addition to the extensive commingling of funds, the ranch properties should have
been included in the marital estate because Husband's ability to dedicate time. and effort in
developing these entities was a direct result of Wife's domestic contributions to the family.
In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), the court held that it was error not to
include in the marital estate the husband's professional corporation and royalty rights on
surgical instruments developed during the marriage. The court emphasized that although the
wife "was not his partner in the business of orthopedic surgery, she was his partner in the
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'business' of marriage and her efforts were necessary contributions to the growth of his
practice and the business." 802 P.2d at 1318.
Like the wife in Dunn, Wife's efforts in maintaining the household and caring for the
children enabled Husband to pursue with vigor his professional career and business enterprises, and he did so at the expense of his family. As described in Dunn, T-N Company
should have been included in the marital estate because Wife and Husband were in the "business of marriage" together.
By failing to account for the undisputed commingling of marital property in T-N
Company over a 27-year period, the trial court abused its discretion. The court's failure to
credit Wife's contribution to Husband's ability to enhance those assets was also an abuse of
discretion. The evidence plainly satisfied the Mortensen tests of commingling and joint
contribution to the enhancement of the asset, and Husband's evidence failed to rebut the
strong presumption that in such circumstances the property should be included in the marital
estate.

B.

Additional Reasons Why Moynier Ranch Should Have Been
Included in the Marital Estate.

Property which was acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital property.
The party seeking to exclude such property from the marital estate, and claiming it as his or
her own separate property, has the burden of proof on that claim. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d
1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
With regard to the Moynier Ranch, the evidence established that the $25,000 down
payment came from joint funds. Husband admitted that $147,000 of the purchase price did
-23-

not come rom separate property, and the court found that the installment payments were paid
with income from the ranching operations earned during the marriage. Income earned on the
ranching operations during the marriage is plainly marital property. Dunn v, Dunn, 802 P .2d
1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Thus, the Moynierproperty, having been acquired with
marital property, was itself marital property.
CONCLUSION
Wife requests that this court reverse the trial court's decision that the Zions Bank
stock and ranch properties were separate property, and remand the case to the trial court with
instructions to divide those properties in kind. See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 120405 (Utah 1983).

~
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ADDENDUM A
MEMORANDUM DECISION

FILED DISTRICT COURT

IMAGED

Third Judicial District

NOV 12 1998
SALT~ COUNTY
By _ _ _\._.JAJ~.-..--:::~~~
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LINDA H. JENSEN,

----------=-----------~~

JAMES T. JENSEN,

7

S" 71

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs.

"2.

.

Case No. 964900752

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for trial October 28-31,
1997, with final oral arguments being scheduled for November 12,
1997.

Thereafter the Court met with counsel to further discuss the

case informally and see if a stipulated resolution could occur.
The discussions were helpful but did not result in a settlement.
During trial the plaintiff was present and represented by her
attorney Harold G. Christensen.

The defendant was present and

represented by his attorney Clark W. Sessions.

The Court heard the

testimony the witnesses presented, received the exhibits, and took
the matter under advisement.

After further review,

the Court

hereby renders this its:

0001~6
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
The parties were married July 30, 1970.
in Carbon County, Utah.

They were each raised

The plaintiff attended two years college

at the College of Eastern Utah, and one year at the University of
Utah, and through the course of the marriage did limited work _
outside the home.

For some period of time she did work as a

secretary/receptionist and bookkeeper in the law offices of her
husband and father-in-law.

She is able-bodied and capable of

working outside the home, but her income would be nominal.
The defendant was admitted to practice law in 1969,

and

practiced in Carbon County with his father, Therald N. Jensen.

The

defendant was previously married and had one child. The parties
together had three children, all but the youngest of whom are
emancipated by age, and the youngest is currently a senior in high
school and will shortly be emancipated.
The defendant 1 s father was a prominent attorney in Price,
Utah.

His financial interests included banking, ranching, and the

practice of law.

For clarity, throughout this opinion when I refer

to Therald N. Jensen, I will refer to him as
11

James 11 ; Jerry Jensen as

Lynne as

11

Bonnie 11 •

11

11

TN 11 ; James Jensen as

Jerry 11 ; Dix Jensen as

11

Butch 11 ; and Bonnie

Therald Jensen's wife was named Bonnie and, if

appropriate, she will be distinguished from
contextual reference by

11

Mrs. Jensen. 11

11

Bonnie Lynne 11 in the

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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As in almost every divorce, the contested issues, excluding
custody, are fundamentally two: first, what is an equitable and
legally appropriate division of property; and second, what amount
should be paid in alimony from the defendant to the plaintiff.
The assets of the marriage are significant.

The plaintiff's

position is that all of the assets now owned should simply be
divided in half.

The defendant's position is that virtually all of

the significant assets of the marriage are separate property having
originated from his parents and should be construed as "separate
property".

If separate property, the defendant argues that he is

entitled to retain the property, as well as the appreciated value
thereof.

The plaintiff has maintained that though much of the

property came originally from gifts and inherited origins, she has
either augmented, maintained or protected the inherited property,
or that it was sufficiently commingled so that it lost its separate
character thus allowing her to share equally in the estate.

The

Court has sincerely struggled with the challenges of the parties'
various positions.
In determining the status of the property, the Court must
first determine whether the property is separate property subject
to retention with the appreciated value; separate property that has
lost its separate identity through being commingled;
property which has

lost

its

separate

separate

identity through

being

augmented, maintained or protected, sufficient to lose its separate

JENSEN V. JENSEN
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identity; and/ or marital property.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

In order to determine this, the

Court must look at each item of property and find the status of
that property.

Thus, the Court finds as follows:
SEPARATE, COMMINGLED MARITAL PROPERTY

In regard to each of the various items of property, the Court
finds and categorizes the property, as follows.
The Court recognizes that a majority of the assets currently
held by the parties have been acquired principally through the T. N.
Jensen family.

Much of the property involved i:n the present

ranching interests was significantly obtained and h.ad its origins
in the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's, prior to the marriage of the
parties.

During the period after initial acquisition and prior to

his death in 1992, T.N. acquired considerable ranching assets and
inventory.

There is no dispute in the testimony that it was his

primary dream to provide ranching opportunities for his children
and their children, consistent with their individual desires.

That

dream has been accomplished well.
1.

T.N. company: The Court finds that T.N. Company is a

Utah partnership formed in approximately 1982 or 1983 by "TN",
"James",

"Jerry", and "Butch".

company to T.N.,

Inc.

T.N. Company is the successor

In the beginning, TN ownE!d 84% of the

company, and at the time of his death he retained 48.6%.

While the

percentages of the three Jensen brothers, according to the official
records are not equal, it was clearly testified to 1:hat they each

JENSEN V. JENSEN
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deem their interest to be equal and that James does not claim any
interest other than one-third, even if the records show otherwise.
T.N. Company is the operating company of the livestock operation,
and has encountered significant losses during recent years.
1996, the losses were $340,000.
1,100 cows,

In

The Company owns in excess of

60 bulls, and 30 horses, with miscellaneous tack,

vehicles and equipment, etc., consistent therewith.

At the present

time, the Company owns a shop building that will be discussed
separately. It is the Court's belief that T.N. Company is comprised
of "inherited property" and should remain the property of James,
including any appreciated value thereon.

Thus, the Court finds the

one-third interest in T.N. Company held by James should remain his
separate property.
2.

T.N. Ranches: T.N. Ranches is the entity which is the

principal owner of the following property:
(a)

The Range Creek Ranch: The Range Creek Ranch, consisting

of a coalition of multiple homesteads, was acquired by T.N. and
Mrs. Jensen during the 1950's.

These properties were contributed

in whole from T.N., and Mrs. Jensen to T.N.,

Inc. which then

transferred the same to T.N. Ranches.
3.

Jensen Brothers Properties: The Court notes that much of

the property is owned in the name of "Jensen Brothers" or James,
Jerry and Butch.

These properties include a substantial interest

in deeded real property, state and federal grazing permits, and

f\ : ,

{I ~

!'I i\ ·

JENSEN V. JENSEN

PAGE 6

U.S. Forest Service permits.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Jensen Brothers is owned one-third by

each of the brothers, and includes the following:
(a)

The Moynier Ranch.

As to the ob1:aining of the

Moynier Ranch, the Court notes that it was purchased through an
agreement,

dated September 1,

1976,

assigned to the three Jensen brothers.

by Butch,

.and thereafter

The evidenc:e was that the

ranch was effectively obtained by Butch, but

assignE~d

to the three

Jensen brothers and paid for through their ranching operations, or
T. N. Company.

There is no evidence of cash calls from marital

estate property from any of the brothers, except for one sum of
approximately $25,000, which apparently was received in cash at the
time of the passing of T.N., the second parent of James to die.
Apparently,
time,

each child received approximately $25, 000, at that

and the Court does not recall whether that $25,000 is

separate from the testimony in which it was stated James put
approximately $25, 000 into the purchase p:r·ice of the lt-toynier Ranch,
arguably from marital property.

The Court believes that it remains

fair and equitable to allow James to retain the whole of the Jensen
Brothers property assets and interests as separate property, and
believes that an equitable offset of the $25,000 whic:::h, if it came
from marital funds, would be subject to sharing, has been equitably
dealt with hereafter in relation to the other assets <Jf the marital
estate:

(b)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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The Black Dragon (Spotted Wolf) Grazing Permit: The land

subject to this grazing permit was obtained by Butch,
brother-in-law James D. Wilcox.
an option to purchase.

and a

It was originally granted through

The interest of Mr. Wilcox was assigned to

Butch and on behalf of Butch, the prior owners were notified in
September of 1980 of the election to exercise the option.

This

property is held in the names of James, Jerry and Butch.

The

purchase price of $55, 000 was paid in annual installments of
$11,000 each, with applicable interest, and the funds for the
purchase being provided by TN.

Thus, the property and successor

interests remain the separate property of James and his brothers.

(c)

The

coal

creek

Farm

and

Orfanakis

Winter

Grazing

Property: This property was acquired prior to 1970 by Mr. and Mrs.
T.N. Jensen, and consists of approximately 360 acres in Wellington,
Utah.

The property was conveyed from T.N. and Mrs. Jensen to T.N.

Ranches in 1983, and from T.N. Ranches to the three Jensen brothers
in 1989.

Thus, the property originated from T.N. and Mrs. Jensen

and remains separate property of James and his brothers.
The Orfanakis Winter Grazing had a similar origin through T.N.
and Mrs. Jensen, and was conveyed from them through T.N. Ranches to
the three Jensen brothers

in 1989,

and remains

the separate

property of James and his brothers.
(d)

The Cisco Winter Grazing Permit:

This

property was

obtained by T.N. for a purchase price of approximately $100,000 in

{I

n !i ~; o 9.
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February of 1987, paid entirely by T.N. and placed ultimately in
the name of the three Jensen brothers.

Thus, it was acquired by TN

and remains the sole and separate property of James and his
brothers.
(e)

The Siaperis Lands: In 1977, T.N. and James entered into

an agreement with Nick and Ileen Siaperis to purchase a 60 acre
field for $70,000.

A month later, the Siaperis assigrned an Earnest

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase they held with Alex and Shirley
Tidwell to T.N. and James, to purchase their property for $60,000.
The combined purchase prices amounted to $130,000. James and his
mother borrowed $130,000 from Walker Bank to pay each price, and
mortgaged the law office building then held exclusive!ly in the name
of Mrs. Jensen.

After the purchase price was paid, the land was

titled in the names of James and his mother, Mrs. Jensen, and later
was traded for property adjoining the Coal Creek farm, taken in the
name of James and his mother, as joint tenants, with the right of
survivorship.

Upon the death of Mrs. Jensen, her interest was

conveyed to Jerry and Butch, as tenants in common. While there
appears to be a present imbalance in the ownership from the onethird interests testified to by James, it does appear that all of
the funds giving rise to purchase of the property came from Mrs.
Jensen through her interest in the office building, and thus, the
present status of the property should remain the separate property

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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of James and his brothers.

The Court will deal with the law office

building hereafter.
(f)

Other Winter BLM Grazing Permits: The ranching company

has BLM authorization in Rock Creek, Fan Canyon, Columbia, and
Icelander grazing permit allotments.

These were all obtained by

T.N. andjor T.N. and his sons prior to 1970, and in February of
1983 were transferred to the three Jensen brothers. This property
would remain separate property of James and his brothers.

There

was

1985,

also

a

Price River

grazing

allotment acquired

in

similarly, by the three Jensen brothers, for nominal consideration,
and to avoid confusion should remain as the separate property of
James and his brothers.
(g) water Rights and Mineral Rights: Water rights and mineral
rights used or associated with any of the ranching andjor farming
operations

remain

the

separate

property

appropriate the other Jensen children.

of

James

and

where

It is the intention of the

Court's award that water rights and mineral rights remain with the
respective properties as awarded hereby.
The Court further notes that none of the aforementioned T.N.
Ranches or Jensen Brothers Properties have ever been titled in the
names of spouses of any of T.N.'s children, nor have any of the
spouses ever been asked to pledge independent credit or support for
the ranching operations. The Court believes it is just, fair and
equitable to consider these properties separate properties from the
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marital estate, and thus the properties, with their appreciated
value, remain the interest of James.
The Court further notes that the testimony submitted at trial
indicated

that

properties,

Linda

and

there

Jensen
was

went
no

very

evidence

maintained or protected the properties.

infrequently
that

she

to

the

augmented,

There was evidence that

James took weekend time away from the family to work on the
properties,

and

the

Court

believes

that

in

the

property

subsequently referred to as "commingled", Linda Jen:sen receives an
equitable allocation to enhance her share of the marital estate.
The

Court

properties,

in

making

a

finding

regarding

the

ranching

also notes particularly that James throughout the

marriage, maintained an active practice of law, and thus, through
that practice,

generated

income to support the

family.

The

ranching operations, while representing significant present value,
have

not been a

major

source of

activities and operations.

James'

funding

for

<:mgoing

family

allocation of time to the

ranching properties has been primarily spare time, away from the
practice of law, but certainly, likewise, away from the family, and
thus at the expense of family sacrifice.
4.

The Monica cove Home: The Monica Cove hc:>me is now the

residence of the plaintiff and two of the parties' children, one of
whom is emancipated by age and employed, the other of whom is a
senior in high school. The history of the funds from which the
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Monica Cove home has been obtained come from an investment of James
prior to the marriage in approximately April of 1968, at which time
he joined with two others in forming the "Mitchell Funeral Home,
Inc. , a Utah corporation."
stores

purchased

the

Thereafter, in May of 1990, Walmart

property

development of a store.

of

the

funeral

operation

for

To accomplish the transaction, Walmart

purchased a lot on Chula Vista Circle in Salt Lake City, which was
traded for

the price of the property,

generating a tax-free

exchange.

The purchase included a home, and the purchase price was

$310,000.

That home was later sold for approximately $391,000.

In addition, a separate payment of $100,000 was made to James
by the succeeding owners of the funeral home in order to purchase
his entire interest in the ongoing business operation. Those two
numbers combined equal $491,000, and that amount was put into the
purchase of the lot and home at Monica Cove.
testimony,

in addition,

The Court heard

that the parties had built a home on

property owned by Linda Jensen's father in Carbon County.

It is to

the marital homes that the petitioner, Linda Jensen, has devoted 27
years of marriage, and to that asset it is the Court's opinion that
she has augmented, maintained and protected the asset of the home
in such a way so as to provide value to the asset and the family's
living circumstances.

The Court notes further that no effort was

made to loan the $491,000 contribution to the marriage, and James,
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the Court believes, did not intend to retain that as separate
property.
Thus,

the Court believes that all assets associated with

obtaining the Monica Cove home, whether they came from the Carbon
County home, the contributions personally of the parties to the
marriage or the value from the Mitchell funeral home, have been
sufficiently commingled so as to negate the defendant's claim to
that being separate property.
5.

The Zions Bank Stock: In August of 1973, three years

after the parties were married, Zions Bank purchased Carbon/Emery
Bank in a stock exchange.

At that time, James received 2, 616

shares of Zions Bank stock listed in his sole and separate name,
representing his interest prior to the marriage in the Carbon/Emery
Bank.

In his testimony during the trial, he stated clearly that he

did not at any time believe that the Zions Bank stock was anything
other than separate property, predating the marriage.

Through

subsequent stock splits and an additional unknown augmentation of
748 shares, the stock, over time, increased James• portion to 8,042
shares of stock.

In June of 1985, James placed all of the stock in

joint tenancy, with the right of survivorship, with the petitioner.
This change was made, according to the testimony of the parties, at
a time in which James was engaged in significant business travel,
and the change was made to avoid probate in the event of his
untimely death.

There is no evidence of any donative intent in

that exchange.
automatic
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Those beginning shares, with stock splits and

divided

reinvestment

purchases,

portion of the stock to 58,352 shares.

have

expanded

that

That leaves 30,141 shares

of stock that the Court believes constitute marital property, and
should be divided equally to each.
6.

The Jensen Law office Building: In early 1974, T.N. and

Mrs. Jensen agreed to gift to James and Jerry approximately 4.2
acres of land northwest of Price.

The brothers constructed a 50'

x 60' shop building, at an approximate cost of $25,000.

At about

that same time, Jerry conveyed an interest in American Transport,
Inc. to James, who changed the name to Malpaso Corporation.

The

Court notes parenthetically that Malpaso Corporation is effectively
defunct,

only

owning

approximately $7,000.

two

trucks

with

a

combined

value

of

The Court finds it is equitable that Malpaso

Corporation be awarded as the sole and separate property of James.
The shop so constructed was used by T.N., Inc., T.N. Company
and Malpaso, when viable, and those companies provided the funds
from which repayment of the bank loan was made.
In January,

1980,

James and Linda,

the joint tenants in

ownership of the shop, conveyed the shop to T.N. who, in return,
conveyed the office building to James and Linda.

The office

building is the same through which both James and T.N. practiced
law.

No monetary consideration was exchanged,

and the off ice

building was of significantly greater value than the shop. The shop
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was thereafter conveyed to T.N. Company, and remains an asset of
T.N. Company at this time.
The office building was sold to the Sampinos family for a net,
after costs and commission, of $172,731.67.
held in Summit Exchange Services, Inc.

This sum is presently

The Court finds that the

value from the office building, the use of the office building
during the term of the marriage, and the apparent variations in
value of the exchange of the office building for

the shop,

justified the Court in finding that the office building asset was
intended by James and T.N. to be a marital asset, and sufficiently
commingled so as to have lost its separate identity. As a marital
asset, it is subject to equal division.
7.

Oil, Gas and Mineral Royalties: The Court finds that the

parties separately and during the course of their marriage have
acquired certain oil, gas and mineral royalties and that since the
trial, certain amounts have been received by James.

With respect

to such oil, gas and mineral interests, the Court finds that they
should be awarded to the party in whose name they are titled and
that such interests which are titled jointly should be equally
divided between them.

The Court finds in addition, that James

should pay to Linda from royalties he has received since the trial
$1,314.95 less estimated tax which James shall pay of $526.00 or a
net sum of $788.95.
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Division of other Miscellaneous Assets: The Court finds

that the furniture, fixtures and personal property at the Monica
Cove home in the approximate value of $75,000 should be awarded to
the plaintiff.

All clothing, jewelry and personal effects of each

party is awarded to each, without consideration of value.
The vehicles are awarded as follows: the 1990 BMW to Linda
Jensen with an equity of $18,675; the 1993 Chevrolet truck is an
asset of T.N. Company, and otherwise considered there; the 1995
Chevrolet Tahoe, with an equitable value of $22,575 is an asset of
James; the 1984 Coachman Motor Home, with an equitable value of
$12,436, is an asset of James; the 1995 Jeep Cherokee, with an
equitable value of $23,925 is an asset of Linda.
The certificates of deposit at Zions Bank in the amount of
$28,982.49, plus subsequent increases, should be divided in half.
Since the trial,

Zions Bank has paid and James has received

dividends totaling .50 per share on the 30,141 shares determined to
be marital property.

James shall pay to Linda as her share of such

dividends the sum of $7, 53 5. 2 5 less income taxes attributable
thereto which James shall pay in the estimated amount of $3,014.00
or a net sum payable to Linda from James of $4,521.25.
The 40 acre parcel of raw ground which abuts the Coal Creek
Farm should be awarded to Linda at a value of $45,000, subject to
existing roadways, ditches and easements.
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The 1996 federal tax refunds of $21,543 shall be divided in
half.
The John Hancock Life Insurance policy, with a cash value of
$55,546 should be awarded to Linda Jensen.
The IRA of each party should be awarded to each, in the amount
of $16,542.63 each.
The value of the Savage Pension Fund of $206,774.27 should be
divided equally to each according to the Woodward formula.
The mantlepiece from the Spring Glen home in the value of
$10,000 should be awarded to James.
The

equity

from

the

sale

of

the

Spring

Glen

home

of

$169,374.72 has been divided equally between the pa.rties.
The TN Jensen Home Place and Big Field shall remain the
separate property of the Jensen children, Jim, Jerry, Bonnie and
Butch, without claim from Linda.
Charges incurred for the chip seal of the roadway on Linda's
father's land which provides access to the Spring Glen home and
Linda's father's home and adjoining property of her father in the
approximate amount of $11,000

is determined to be a marital

obligation and should be shared and paid equally by the parties.
The Court further finds that it is fair and equitable to each
to be responsible for any and all acquired obligations after the
separation of the parties.
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In addition, it is equitable for James to hold the petitioner
harmless on the first mortgage to Far West Bank, and the line of
credit to Zions Bank in the combined amount of $203,000, thus,
allowing the plaintiff to continue residing in the home without a
mortgage obligation, and thereby allowing her to elect to remain
there, so long as she wishes.
The Court having previously categorized the property, now to
illustrate the division creates the following schedule:
Description
Monica Cove Home
Value
Combined mortgages
Net equity

M/NM

James

Linda

M
$ 771,000.00
203,993.51
$ 567,006.49
2
$ 283,503.25

'":"

Monica Cove Furniture
Value
$

M

75,000.00

$283,503.25 $283,503.25

M

37,500.00

37,500.00

M

781,782.19

781,782.19

Price Law Office Building
Value
$ 172,731.67

M

86,365.84

86,365.84

1990 BMW

$

18,675.00

M

9,337.50

9,337.50

1995 Chevrolet
Tahoe

$

22,575.00

M

11,287.50

11,287.50

1984 Coachman
Motor Home

$

12,436.00

M

6,218.00

$ 6,218.00

1995 Jeep Cherokee

$

23,925.00

M

11,962.50

11,962.50

Zions Bank Stock
30,141 shares @51.875
Value
$1,563,564.38
+

2

$

781,782.19

$

Certificates of
fJtlu,_
(· (\ ') .(I

2.
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Deposit - Zions

$

28,925.00

M

14,491.25

141491.25

1996 tax refund

$

21,543.00

M

10,771.50

10,771.50

John Hancock
Life Policy

$

55,546.00

M

27,773.00

27,773.00

M

16,542.63

16,542.63

IRA of each party
Savage Pension

$ 206,774.27

M

103,387.14

103,387.14

Mantlepiece

$

10,000.00

M

5,000.00

5,000.00

Spring Glen Home
equity previously
divided between the
parties

$ 169,374.72

M

84,687.36

84,687.36

$1,490,609.66 $1,490,609.66
Based upon the Court's general equitable power, the Court finds
that certain of these assets should not be divided equally to the
parties, even though they were acquired during the course of the
marriage and have been determined by the Court to constitute in part
the marital estate. The court finds that an appropriate equitable
distribution of the foregoing assets is as follows:
SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT TO

AMOUNT TO

JIM

LINDA

Monica Cove Property
Furniture
Mortgages on Monica Cove

771,000.00
75,000.00
<203,993.51>

Zions Bank Stock
(30141 shares @ $51.875)

781,782.19

18,365.84*

1990 BMW 750
1995 Chevrolet Tahoe

781,782.19*

22,575.00
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12,436.00

1984 Coachman Motor Home
1995 Jeep Cherokee

23,925.00

Zions Bank Certificate
of Deposit

29,500.00*

Estimated taxes on Interest
1996 Tax Refund

<485.00>
21,543.00

John Hancock Life Insurance
Cash Value
IRA of each party
Savage Pension

55,546.00*
16,542.63

16,542.63*

103,387.14

103,387.14*

Mantle Piece

10,000.00

SpringGlen Home Equity

84,687.36

84,687.36*

4 o acre parcel

45,000.00*

Net Proceeds from sale of
Price Office Building

172,731.67

Estimated taxes on sales
proceeds

<23,293.00>

Estimated interest earned on
Price Office Building Sale
Proceeds @ 3% since sale in
May 1997

6,477.00

Estimated taxes on interest
earned on Price Office
Building sale

<2,590.00>

TOTAL

$1. 001. 800.48

$2,004,736.16

Next, the Court must turn to the issue of alimony.
finds certainly,

that with a

alimony is appropriate.

27-year marriage,

The Court

that permanent

However, the Court finds that having made

an equitable distribution of the assets unequally and granting to
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the plaintiff the greater portion of the marital assets,

and

recognizing in so doing that the defendant had the benefit of
premarital assets that are now of significant appreciated value, the
Court determines that assets valued at $1,134,811.16 (noted by"*")
could be considered by the plaintiff as working assets, capable of
generating a rate of return.
average 7. 5% per year,

Assuming that rat•e of return to

that amount should yield an income of

$85,110.84, or $7,092.57 per month.

In addition, that Court would

note that while it is not my desire, nor the expec1:ed need of the
plaintiff to sell her home and move to a home of cc::>mparable value
to that occupied by the defendant, the plaintiff could generate an
additional

$200,000

differential

amount,

which

could

earn an

additional $15,000 per year, or $1,250 per month.
Thus,
generated

the
from

Court

could

the assets

find

the

income

potentially

awarded to the plaintiff would be

sufficient to meet her needs.
term of the marriage,

that

However, this ignores the 27 year

and strikes the Court as fundamentally

inequitable when the defendant would not be required to live off of
the yield from his assets, but has separate earned inc:::ome.

Assuming

defendant's annual gross income to be approximately $195,000, that
gives him a monthly gross income of $16,250 per month . Defendant has
been paying approximately $6,000 per month in temporary alimony
during the parties' separation, but the plaintiff has: been required
to pay the mortgage on the Monica Cove home in the approximate
amount of $2,200, so requiring the defendant to hold the plaintiff
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harmless on that mortgage, the court finds that it is reasonable to
require the defendant to pay alimony in the amount of $4,000 per
month from November 1, 1997, until the defendant reaches age 65. The
court notes the defendant is now just over 55, having a birthday in
February.

After age 65, each party should be required to bear their

future expenses based upon their earnings generated from assets The
court finds that the present value of the alimony award here, based
on the assumption of a 10 year term, assuming earning capacity on
the fund of 7.5%, is $336,987.97.

Should the defendant elect from

his awarded property, he may pay at any time the present value of
the remaining alimony payable at a discount rate of 7. 5% and
terminate the alimony obligations.

Otherwise, the Court orders the

alimony to continue uninterrupted, unless the defendant should die
or reach age 65.

No other event should terminate the alimony.

Defendant shall be given credit against his alimony obligation of
$2,500 which he paid subsequent to the trial.
The Court having divided the assets as heretofore stated, finds
that the present value of the plaintiff's individual net worth,
after marital division is $2,004,736.16, and the present value of
the defendant's individual net worth, after division of marital
assets is $1,001,800.48, not including the significant assets of the
ranching operations, properties and bank stock which have been
declared separate property.
Each of the parties should be required to execute and deliver
to the other such deeds, assignments, conveyances and bills of sale
flfl(jf)·f ~-
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as each may request from time to time with respec·t to the assets
awarded to the respective parties, including those assets which the
Court has found and determined to be separate properties from the
marital estate.

,,

~

Dated this day of
A
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ADDENDUMB
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
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one Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LINDA H. JENSEN,

SUPPLEMENTAL
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil No. 964900752

JAMES T. JENSEN,

Judge David s. Young
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett

Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on regularly for trial before
the undersigned, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court
commencing

on

October

28,

1997

arguments on November 12, 1997.

and

concluding

with

closing

Thereafter, the Respondent moved

the Court to bifurcate the proceedings and to immediately grant a
Decree of Divorce to the Petitioner which the Court did by Decree
of Divorce entered in the above-captioned action on June 22, 1998.
The Court thereafter considered the evidence and testimony adduced,
the arguments and statements of counsel, the files and records
herein and the law appertaining thereto and having issued its

Memorandum Decision on November 12, 1998, and being fully advised
in the premises, now make and enters the following:
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties were married each to the

other on July 30, 1970, a marriage of some 28 years.
2.

The Court finds that the parties were each raised in

Carbon County, State of Utah and that the Plaint:iff, following
graduation from high school,

attended two years of College of

Eastern Utah and one year at the University of Utah.
3.

The Court finds that during the course <')f the parties'

marriage, the Plaintiff engaged in limited work outside of the
parties' home, including some work as a secretary/receptionist and
bookkeeper in the law offices of her husband and her father-in-law,
Therald N. Jensen,

("TN Jensen") who was a promimmt attorney in

Price, Utah, until his death.

Additionally, the Court finds that

TN Jensen's financial interests included banking and ranching as
well as the practice of law.
4.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is able-bodied and

capable of working outside of the home, but that her income from
employment would be nominal.
5.

The Court finds

that the Defendant was admitted to

practice law in the State of Utah in 1969 and practiced primarily
in carbon County, State of Utah, with his father until a fairly
recent move to Salt Lake City, Utah, where he accepted employment
2

with and is currently employed by Savage Industries as Executive
Vice

President

and

General

Counsel

with

annual

earnings

of

approximately $195,000, which includes bonuses from time to time.
Further, the Court finds that the Defendant is a member of the
board of directors of Zions First National Bank from which he
receives director's

fees

and that he has other dividend and

interest earnings from investments and other business operations as
hereinafter more fully set forth.
6.

The Court finds that the Defendant was previously married

and had one child born as the issue of that marriage.

Further, the

Court finds that the parties had three children born as the issue
of their marriage, two of whom are emancipated by age and the
youngest of whom is currently a senior in high school and will
shortly be emancipated.
7.

The

Court

finds

that

the

Defendant

has substantial

separate property which originated from his parents as well as from
gifts and inheritances which the Court further finds were not
commingled with marital property and that the Plaintiff did not
augment,

maintain or protect the same sufficient to lose the

identify of such properties as separate properties.

With respect

to such separate property, the Court finds that such was acquired
principally through the TN Jensen family and that much of the
property involved in the Defendant's current ranching interest was
significantly obtained and had it origins in the 1940's, 1950's and
3

1960's, prior to the marriage of the parties.

Additionally, the

Court find that during the period after the initial acquisition of
such properties and prior to his death in 1992, TN

~rensen

considerable ranching interests and inventory.

~rhe

acquired

Court also

finds that the testimony is undisputed that it was the primary
dream of TN Jensen to provide ranching opportunities for his
children and

their

children consistent with their

individual

desires and that such dream was well accomplished.
8.

The court finds that T.N. Company is a Utah partnership

formed in approximately 1982 or 1983 by TN Jensen and his children,
James, Jerry and Butch.

The Court also finds that

the successor company to T.N., Inc.

~·.N.

Company is

In the beginning, TN Jensen

owned 84% of the company and at the time of his death, he retained
48.6% of the company.

While the percentage ownership interests of

the three Jensen brothers according to the official records are not
equal, it was clear from the testimony that they each deemed their
interest to be equal and that the Defendant claims only a one-third
interest regardless of what the official records may show or
reflect.
9.

The Court finds

that T.N.

Company

is the operating

company of the livestock operations and has encountered significant
losses during recent years.

In 1996, such losses were $340,000.

TN Company owns in excess of 1,100 cows, 60 bulls and 30 horses

4

with

miscellaneous

tack,

vehicles

finds

that

and

equipment

consistent

therewith.
10.

The

Court

T.N.

Company

is

comprised of

inherited property and should remain the sole and separate property
of the Defendant including any appreciated value thereon.
11.

The court finds that T.N. Ranches is the entity which is

the principal owner of the Range Creek Ranch which consists of a
coalition of multiple homesteads and was acquired by T.N. Jensen
and his wife during the 1950s.

such properties were contributed in

whole from TN Jensen and Mrs. Jensen to T.N., Inc. which then
transferred the same to T.N. Ranches.
12.

The Court finds that much of the property is titled in

the name of "Jensen Brothers" or their individual names.

Such

properties include a substantial interest in deeded real property,
state and federal grazing permits and u.s. Forest Service permits.
The Court finds that Jensen Brothers is owned one-third by each of
the brothers and includes the following:
a.

The Moynier Ranch.

The Court finds that the Moynier

Ranch was purchased through an agreement dated September 1, 1976 by
Butch Jensen and thereafter assigned to the three Jensen brothers.
The evidence adduced at trial was that the Moynier Ranch was
effectively obtained by Butch Jensen but assigned to the three
Jensen brothers and paid for through the ranching operations or
T.N. Company.

The Court finds that there was no evidence of cash
5

calls from marital estate property from any of the brothers, except
for one sum of approximately $25,000 which apparently was received
in cash at the time of the passing of TN Jensen, the second parent
of the Defendant to die.

Each child received approximately $25,000

at that time and while it is unclear as to whether the $25,000 is
separate from the testimony in which it was test:ified that the
Defendant put approximately $25,000 into the purchase price of the
Moynier Ranch, arguably from marital property, the Court finds that
it remains fair,

just and equitable to allow the Defendant to

retain the whole of the Jensen Brothers property assets and
interests as his sole and separate property and further finds that
as an equitable offset of the $25,000 which,

if it came from

marital funds would be subject to sharing, has been

~equitably

dealt

with in relation to other assets of the marital estate hereinafter
described.
b.

The Black Dragon {Spotted Wolf) Grazing Permit: The

Court finds said permit was obtained by Butch Jensen and a brotherin-law, James D. Wilcox through an option to purchase.

Thereafter

the interests of Mr. Wilcox was assigned to Butch Jensen and on
behalf of Butch the prior owners were notified in September of 1980
of the election to exercise such option.

This asset is held in the

names of each of the Jensen brothers individually.

The purchase

price of $55,000, the Court finds was paid in annual installments
of $11,000 each, with applicable interest and the funds for the
6

purchase were provided by TN Jensen.

As such, the property and

successor interests remain the separate property of the Defendant
and his brothers.
c.

The Coal Creek Farm and Orfanakis Winter Grazing

Property was acquired prior to 1970 by TN Jensen and his wife and
consists of approximately 360 acres in Wellington, Utah.

That

property was conveyed from TN Jensen and his wife to T.N. Ranches
in 1983 and from T.N. Ranches to the three Jensen brothers in 1989.
Thus, the property originated from TN Jensen and his wife and
remains the separate property of the Defendant and his brothers.
The Court also finds that the Orfanakis Winter Grazing Property had
an origin similar to the Coal Creek Farm through TN Jensen and his
wife and was conveyed from them through T.N. Ranches to the three
Jensen brothers in 1989 and remains the sole and separate property
of the Defendant and his brothers.
d.

The Cisco Winter Grazing Permit was obtained by TN

Jensen for a purchase price of approximately $100,000 in February
of 1987, which purchase price was paid entirely by TN Jensen and
placed ultimately in the name of the three Jensen brothers.
such,

As

it was acquired by TN Jensen and remains the sole and

separate property of the Defendant and his brothers.
e.

The Siaperis Lands were acquired pursuant to an

agreement with Nick and Ileen Siaperis in 1977 whereunder a 60 acre
field was acquired for $70, ooo.

Approximately one month later, the
7

Siaperis' assigned an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
they held with Alex and Shirley Tidwell to TN Jensen and the
Defendant to purchase their property for $60,000.
purchase price amounted to $130,000.

The combined

The Defendant: and his mother

borrowed $130, ooo from Walker Bank to pay the combined purchase
price and mortgaged the law office building, then held exclusively
in the name of Mrs. Jensen as security for such lc::>an.

After the

purchase price was paid, the land was titled in the names of the
Defendant

and

his

mother

and

later was

traded

for

property

adjoining the Coal Creek Farm which was titled in ·the name of the
Defendant

and

survivorship.

his

mother

as

joint

tenants

with

rights

of

Upon the death of Mrs. Jensen, her interest was

conveyed to Jerry Jensen and Butch Jensen as tenants in common.
While there appears to be an imbalance presently in the ownership
from the one-third interest testified to by the Def,endant, it does
appear that all of the funds giving rise to the purchase of the
property came from Mrs. Jensen through her interests in the office
building and thus the property should remain the separate property
of the Defendant and his brothers.
f.

The Court finds that the ranching company has BLM

authorization in Rock Creek, Fan Canyon, Columbia, and Icelander
grazing permit allotments.

These grazing permit allotments were

all obtained by TN Jensen andfor TN Jensen and the three Jensen
brothers prior to 1970 and in February of 1983 were transferred to
8

the three Jensen brothers.

These assets, together with a Price

River grazing allotment acquired in 1985, similarly, by the three
Jensen brothers, for nominal consideration, and to avoid confusion
should remain the separate property of the Defendant and his
brothers.

g.

The

Court

finds

that various water

rights and

mineral rights used or associated with any of the ranching andjor
farming operations are the separate property of the Defendant and
where appropriate, the other Jensen children.

As such, the water

rights and mineral rights remain with the respective properties as
awarded by the Court.
13.

The Court finds that none of the aforementioned T. N.

Ranches or Jensen Brothers Properties have ever been titled in the
names of spouses of any of TN Jensen's children nor have any of the
spouses ever been requested to pledge independent credit or support
for the ranching operations.
fair,

As such, the Court finds that it is

just and equitable that such properties be found to be

separate

properties

from

the

marital

estate,

including

any

appreciated value therein.
14.

The Court finds that the testimony at trial was that the

Plaintiff went very infrequently to the properties and there was no
evidence

that

properties.

she

augmented,

maintained

or

protected

the

Further, the Court finds that while there was evidence
9

that the Defendant took weekend time away from the family to work
on the properties, and that in the property subsequently referred
to as "commingled" Plaintiff will receive, the Court finds that she
will

receive

through

the

distribution

of

assets

herein,

an

equitable allocation to enhance her share of the marital estate.
15.

The

Court

finds

that

the

Defendant

throughout the-

marriage maintained an active practice of law and thus through that
practice generated income to support the Plaintiff and their family
and that while the ranching operations represent a significant
present value, they have not been a major source of funding for
ongoing family activities and operations.

Additionally, the Court

finds that the Defendant's allocation of time to the ranching
properties has been primarily spare time away from the practice of
law, but certainly likewise, away from the family, and thus at the
expense of family sacrifices.
16.

That during the marriage of the parties, a residence and

real property known as the Monica Cove home, which is now the
residence of the Plaintiff and two of the parties' children, one of
whom is emancipated by age and employment and the ot:her of whom is
a senior in high school was acquired.

The Court furt:her finds that

the funds used to acquire the Monica Cove residence and real
property were obtained from an investment of the DefEmdant prior to
the marriage of the parties in approximately April of 1968.

At

that time, he joined with two other individuals in forming the
10

Mitchell Funeral Home, Inc., a Utah corporation.

Thereafter, in

May of 1990, Walmart stores purchased the property of the funeral
operations

for

development

of

a

store

in

Price,

Utah.

To

accomplish the transaction, Walmart purchased a lot on Chula Vista
Circle in Sale Lake city, Utah, which was traded for the price of
the property generating a tax free exchange.

The purchase included

a home and the purchase price was $310,000.
sold for approximately $391,000.

The home was later

Further, the Court finds that a

separate payment of $100, 000 was made to the Defendant by the
succeeding owners of the funeral home in order to purchase his
entire interest in the ongoing business operations.

Those two

amounts combined, equal $491,000, which amount was put into the
purchase of the lot and home at Monica Cove.

Additionally, the

evidence was that the parties had built a home on property owned by
the Plaintiff's father in Carbon County, Utah and it is to those
marital homes that the Plaintiff has devoted 28 years of marriage
and as to the Monica Cove residence and real property that the
Court finds

that the Plaintiff has augmented,

maintained and

protected the same in such a way so as to provide value to the
asset and the family's living circumstances.

The Court finds in

addition, that no effort was made to loan the $491,000 contribution
to the marriage and the Defendant did not intend to retain that
asset as his sole and separate property.

As such, the Court finds

that all assets associated with obtaining the Monica Cove residence
11

and real property, whether they came from the Carbon County home,
the contribution personally of the parties to the marriage or the
value from the Mitchell Funeral Home,

have been sufficiently

commingled so as to negate a finding that the MoniccL Cove residence
and real property

is the sole and separate property of the

Defendant.
17.

The Court finds that in August of 1973, 3 years after the

parties were married, Zions Bank purchased the Carbon Emery Bank in
a stock exchange.

At that time, the Defendant received 2, 616

shares of Zions Bank stock listed in his sole ancl separate name
which represented his interest in the Carbon Emery Bank prior to
the parties' marriage.

The testimony was clear that the Defendant

did not at any time believe that the Zions Bank stock was anything
other than separate property pre-dating the marriage.

Through

subsequent stock splits and an additional unknown augmentation of
748 shares, such stock over time increased the Defendant's portion
to 8, 042 shares of stock.

Those beginning shares with stock splits

and automatic dividend reinvestment purchases have expanded that
portion of the stock to 58,352 shares.
18.
placed

The Court finds that in June of 1985,
all

of

the

stock

in

survivorship with the Plaintiff.

joint

tenancy

the Defendant

with

rights

of

This change was made according to
•

the testimony of the parties at a time when the Defendant was
engaged in significant business travel, and the change was made to
12

avoid probate in the event of his untimely death.

There was no

evidence adduced at the trial of any donative intent with respect
to such exchange.
19.

The Court finds that during the course of the parties'

marriage, additional shares in Zions Bank were acquired in a total
amount after stock splits and dividend reinvestment purchases to an
existing total of 30,141 shares of such stock, which the Court
finds to be marital property and equally divided between the
parties.

Since the trial, Zions Bank has paid and the Defendant

has received dividends totaling .50 per share on the 30,141 shares
determined to be marital property.

The Court further finds that

the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff as her share of such
dividends, the sum of $7,535.25 less income taxes attributable
thereto which the Defendant shall pay in the approximate amount of
$3,014, resulting in a net sum payable to the Plaintiff from the
Defendant of $4,521.25.
20.
wife

The Court finds that in early 1974, TN Jensen and his

agreed

to

gift

to

the

Defendant

and

Jerry

Jensen,

approximately 4.2 acres of land northwest of Price, Utah.

The two

Jensen brothers constructed on that property a 50' x 60' shop
building, at an approximate cost of $25,000.

At approximately that

same time, Jerry Jensen conveyed an interest in American Transport,
Inc. to the Defendant who changed the name of that corporation to
Malpaso Corporation which the Court finds is effectively defunct,
13

owning only two trucks with a

combined value o:f approximately

The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable that

$7,000.

Malpaso Corporation be awarded to the Defendant as his sole and
separate property.
The Court finds that the shop constructed on the land

21.

hereinabove described was used by T.N., Inc. and T.N. Company and
Malpaso Corporation when viable and those compani1es provided the
funds from which the repayment of the bank loan was made.

In

January, 1980, the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the joint tenants
in ownership of the shop, conveyed the same to TN Jensen who in
return

conveyed the

Defendant.

office

The office

building to the

Plaintiff

building described herein

is

and the
the

same

building through which both TN Jensen and the Defendant practiced
law.

No monetary consideration was exchanged and the office

building was of significantly greater value than the shop.

The

shop was thereafter conveyed to T. N. Company and r<emains an asset
of T.N. Company at this time.
22.

Sampinos

The Court finds that the office building was sold to the
family

$172,731.67,

for

which

a

sum

Exchange Services, Inc.

net
is

after

costs

presently held

and

commission,

of

in esc::row at Summit

The Court further finds that the value

from the office building, the use of the office building during the
term of the marriage and the apparent variations in value of the
exchange of the office building for the shop, justifies the finding
14

that the office building asset was intended by the Defendant and TN
Jensen to be a marital asset and was sufficiently commingled so as
to have lost its separate identity.

As a marital asset, the Court

finds it is subject to equal division between the parties.
23.

The Court finds that the parties separately and during

the course of their marriage, have acquired certain oil, gas and
mineral royalties and that since the trial, certain amounts have
been received by the Defendant therefrom.

With respect to such

oil, gas and mineral interests, the Court finds that they should be
awarded to the party in whose name they are titled and that such
interests which are titled
between the parties.
Defendant

jointly should be equally divided

Additionally,

should pay to

the

the Court finds that the

Plaintiff

from royal ties he has

received since the trial, a net sum of $788.95 representing gross
receipts of $1,314.95 less estimated tax which the Court finds the
Defendant should pay of $526.00.
24.

The Court finds that the furniture,

furnishings and

personal property at the Monica Cove home have an approximate value
of $75,000 and should be awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and
separate property, together with all clothing, jewelry and personal
effects, without consideration as to value.
25.

The Court finds that all clothing, jewelry and personal

effects of the Defendant should be awarded to him as his sole and
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separate property without consideration of value, together with a
mantle piece from the Spring Glen home with a value of $10,000.
26.

The Court finds that the TN Jensen Home Place and Big

Field shall remain the separate property of the J"ensen children,
namely the Defendant, Jerry Jensen, Bonnie Jensen and Butch Jensen,
without claim from the Plaintiff and that she has waived any claim
thereto in open court.
27.

The Court finds that the 40 acre parcel of raw ground

which abuts the Coal Creek Farm should be awarded to the Plaintiff
as her sole and separate property at a value of $45,000, subject to
existing roadways, ditches and easements.
28.

The Court finds that the parties have acquired various

vehicles and that the Plaintiff should be awarded the 1990 BMW
vehicle with an equity of $18,675 and the 1995 Jeep Cherokee
automobile with an equitable value of $23,925.

The Court further

finds that the 1993 Chevrolet truck is an asset of

'l~.N.

Company and

has otherwise been considered herein and that the Defendant should
be awarded as his sole and separate property, the 1995 Chevrolet
Tahoe with an equitable value of $22,575 and the 1985 Coachman
motor home with an equitable value of $12,436.
29.

The Court finds that certain certificates of deposit at

Zions Bank in the amount of $28,982.49 plus subsequent increases
should be equally divided between the parties.
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30.

The Court finds

that the parties'

1996 federal tax

refunds of $21,543 shall be divided equally between the parties.
31.

The Court finds

that an existing John Hancock life

insurance policy with a cash value of $55,546 should be awarded to
the Plaintiff as her sole and separate property and further finds
that each of the parties should be awarded their

individual

retirement accounts in the amount of $16,542.63 each.
32.

The Court finds that since the parties' marriage and

continuing to the date of the trial in this matter, the Defendant
has vested benefits in the Savage Pension Fund of $206,774.27 which
should be divided equally to each according to the Woodward formula
and that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order should be entered
with respect thereto.
33.

The Court finds that the equity resulting from the sale

of the Spring Glen home of $169,374.72 has been divided equally
between the parties, provided however, charges incurred for the
chip seal of the roadway on the Plaintiff's father's land which
provided access to the Spring Glen home and Plaintiff's father's
home and adjoining property of her father,

in the amount of

$11, 000, the court finds is a martial obligation and should be
shared and paid equally by the parties.
34.

The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable that

each of the parties be responsible for any and all acquired
obligations after their separation.
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35.
the

The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable for

Defendant to hold the Plaintiff harmless

from the

first

mortgage obligation on the Monica Cove residence and real property
to Far West Bank and the line of credit to Zions Bank in the
combined amount of $203, ooo, thereby allowing the Plaintiff to
continue residing in such home without a mortgage obligation for as
long as she wishes.
36.

The Court finds pursuant to its general equitable powers

that certain assets should not be divided equally between the
parties even though they were acquired during

the~

course of the

marriage and have been determined by the Court tc' constitute in
part, the martial estate.

By awarding the Plaintiff the greater

portion of the marital assets, a total of $2,004,736.16 as compared
to the marital assets awarded to the Defendant of $1,001,800.48,
the Court recognizes that in so doing the Defendant has had the
benefit of premarital assets that are now of significant value.
The Court also finds that certain of the excess assets are working
assets which the Court finds to be $1,134,811.16 which are capable
of generating a rate of return and income to the Plaintiff for her
support and maintenance.

Assuming that rate of return to average

7. 5% per annum, which the Court finds is reasonable that amount
should yield an income of $85,110.84 or $7,092.57 per month to the
Plaintiff.

Additionally, should the Plaintiff desire to sell the

Monica Cove residence and move to a home of comparable value to
18

that occupied by the Defendant, the Plaintiff could generate an
additional $200,000 which could earn an additional $15,000 per year
or $1,250 per month.
37.

The

generated

Court

from

the

could
assets

sufficient to meet her needs.
findings

find

that

awarded

to

the
the

income potentially
Plaintiff

would

be

The Court finds however, that such

ignore the 27 year term of the parties'

marriage and

equity requires that the Plaintiff should not be required to live
off of the yield from her assets when the Defendant would not be
required to do so by reason of his separate earned income.
Court

finds

that

the

Defendant's

annual

gross

income

The
is

.- .

approximately $195,000, which provides a monthly gross income of
$16,250 per month.
$6,000

per

month

The Defendant has been paying approximately
in

temporary

alimony

during

the

parties'

separation on a voluntary basis but the Plaintiff has been paying
the mortgage on the Monica Cove residence in the approximate amount
of $2,200.

The Court therefore finds that the Defendant has the

ability

pay

to

and

it

is

fair,

just

and

equitable

that

the

Defendant hold the Plaintiff harmless from that mortgage and that
he should be required to pay to the Plaintiff alimony in the amount
of $4,000 per month from November 1, 1997 until he reaches the age
of 65 years.

After age 65 years, each party should be required to

bear their future expenses based upon their earnings generated from
their separate assets.

The Court finds that the present value of
19

the alimony award based on the assumption of a ten year term and
assuming a return on the fund of 7.5% is $336,987.97.

Should the

Defendant elect, from his awarded property, he may pay at any time,
the present value of the remaining alimony payable at a discount
rate of 7.5% and terminate his alimony obligation.

Otherwise, the

alimony shall continue uninterrupted until the earlier of the death
of the Defendant or his attainment of age 65.
should terminate the alimony.

No other event

The Court finds in addition, that

the Defendant should be given credit against his alimony obligation
of the sum of $2,500 which he paid subsequent to the trial.
38.

Based upon the foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact,

the Court now concludes as follows:
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

To the extent the foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact

are Supplemental Conclusions of Law, the same are adopted herein in
all respects.
2.

That each of the parties should be required to execute

and deliver to the other, such deeds, assignments, conveyances and
bills of sale as each may request from time to time 'With respect to
the assets awarded to the respective parties including those assets
which the Court has found and determined to be separate properties
from the marital estate.
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3.

That each of the parties should assume, pay, discharge

and hold the other harmless from any and all acquired obligations
after the separation of the parties.
4.

That each of the parties should assume, pay, discharge

and hold the other harmless from their separate costs and attorneys
fees incurred herein.
5.

That the Court should make and enter its Supplemental

Decree of Divorce accordingly.
DATED this

~of

January, 1999.

1999 •

...
OLD G. CHR STENSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUMC
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE

FILED DIST
Third

Jud;~~770ISfrtct
~0~Rr

CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981}
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
Telephone:
(801) 322-2516
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

.
...

LINDA H. JENSEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES T. JENSEN,

SUPPLEMENTAL
DECREE OF DIVORCE

~ J :l 3 <g5Cf'
Civil No. 964900752
Judge David s. Young
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett

Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on regularly for trial before
the undersigned, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court
commencing

on

October

28,

1997

arguments on November 12, 1997.

and

concluding

with

closing

Thereafter, the Respondent moved

the Court to bifurcate the proceedings and to immediately grant a
Decree of Divorce to the Petitioner which the Court did by Decree
of Divorce entered in the above-captioned action on June 22, 1998.
The Court thereafter considered the evidence and testimony adduced,
the arguments and statements of counsel, the files and records
herein and the law appertaining thereto and having issued its
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Memorandum Decision on November 12, 1998, and being fully advised
in the premises, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded and the

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff as
and for alimony, the sum of $4,000 per month commencing November 1,
1997 and continuing until the attainment by the Defendant of the
age of 65 years, or his earlier death.

Otherwise, the Court orders

that the alimony awarded hereby shall continue uninterrupted and
shall not terminate.
2.

That the Defendant shall be given credit against his

alimony obligation, in the sum of $2,500 which he paid subsequent
to the trial of the case.
3.

That the Defendant shall have the right at any time to

pay the present value of the remaining alimony due ·the Plaintiff at
a discount rate of 7. 5% per annum and should he do so,

all

remaining alimony obligations from the Defendant to the Plaintiff
shall be terminated.
4.

That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her

sole and separate property, without claim from thE! Defendant, the
following:
a.

The Monica Cove residence and real property at a

value of $771,000;
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b.

Furniture, furnishings and personal property located

at the Monica Cove residence and real property at a value of
$75,000;
c.

15,070.50

shares

of

Zions

Bank

stock at an

approximate value of $781,782.19;
d.

1990 BMW 750 automobile at a value of $18,365.84;

e.

1995 Jeep Cherokee automobile at a value of $23,925;

f.

Zions Bank Certificate of Deposit at a value of

$29,500;
g.

Life

insurance

cash value

-

John Hancock Life

Insurance Company in the approximate amount of $55,546;
h.

Plaintiff • s individual retirement account in the

approximate sum of $16,542.63;
i.

One-half of Defendant's retirement plan at Savage

Industries in the sum of $103,387.14, to be divided pursuant
to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order;
j.

One-half

of

the

proceeds

from

the

sale of a

residence and real property located in carbon County and known
as the Spring Glen home in the sum of $84,687.36;
k.
Creek

40 acre parcel of raw ground which abuts the coal
Farm at a

value

of

$45,000,

subject to existing

roadways, ditches and easements.
1.

All of Plaintiff's clothing, jewelry and personal

effects;
3
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m.

Any oil,

gas and mineral royalties and interests

titled solely in the name of the Plaintiff and one-half of any
such interests titled in the joint names of the Plaintiff and
the Defendant;
n.

The sum of $1,314.95 representing Plaintiff's share

of oil and gas royalties received by Defendant since the
trial, less income taxes attributable thereto in the estimated
amount of $526.00, for a net sum of $788.95;
o.

The sum of $7,535.25, representing Plaintiff's share

of dividends received by the Defendant since ·the trial on the
parties'

joint marital Zions Bank stock le:ss income taxes

attributable thereto in the estimated amount of $3,014.00 for
a net sum of $4,521.25;
5.

The Defendant shall be awarded as his sole and separate

property, without claim from the Plaintiff, the following:
a.
successor

TN

Company,

to T. N. ,

a

Utah

partnership

Inc. ,

which

interest

which is the

equals

one-third

thereof;
b.

T.N. Ranches, which is the principal owner of the

Range Creek Ranch which consists of a coalition of multiple
homesteads;
c.

Jensen

substantial

Brothers

interests

Properties, which includes

in deeded real property,

federal grazing permits,

and u.s.

Forest

state and

s~ervice

permits,

4
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including the Moynier Ranch, and the Black Dragon (Spotted
Wolf) Grazing Permit;
d.

The Coal creek Farm and Orphanakis Winter Grazing

Property;
e.

The Cisco Winter Grazing Permit;

f.

The Siaperis lands and BLM authorizations in Rock

Creek, Fan Canyon, Columbia, Icelander and Price River grazing
permit allotments, water rights and mineral rights used or
associated with any of the ranching andjor farming operations;
h.

58,352 shares of Zions Bank stock as Defendant's

pre-marital property.
i.

15,070.50

shares

of

Zions

Bank

stock at an

approximate value of $781,782.19;
j.

The sales proceeds of the Jensen Law Office building

or $172,731.67, together with interest thereon since May 1997
in the sum of $6,477, less income taxes attributable thereto
in the estimated sum of $25,883.00;
k.

1995 Chevrolet Tahoe at a value of $22,575;

1.

1984 Coachman motor home at a value of $12,436;

m.

The parties' 1996 income tax refund of $21,543.00;

n.

Defendant's individual retirement account in the

approximate sum of $16,542.63;

5
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o.

One-half of Defendant's retirement plan at Savage

Industries in the sum of $103,387.14, to be divided pursuant
to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order;
p.

The mantle piece from the Spring Glen home at a

value of $10,000;
q.

One-half

of

the

proceeds

from

the

sale of a

residence and real property located in Carbon County and known
as the Spring Glen home in the sum of $84,687.36;
r.

All of Respondent's clothing, jewelry and personal

effects;
s.
6.

The TN Jensen Home Place and Big Field.

That the Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume,

pay, discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless from the parties'
first mortgage obligation on the Monica cove residence and real
property in favor of Far West Bank and the line of credit to Zions
Bank in the combined amount of $203,000, together 1Nith the income
tax obligations hereinabove set forth;
7.

Charges incurred in the amount of $11,000 for the chip

seal of the roadway providing access to the Spring Glen home is a
marital obligation and the same is ordered to be shared and paid
equally by the parties.

That other than as set forth herein, each

of the parties be and they are hereby ordered to assume,
discharge

and

hold

the

other

party

harmless

from

pay,

obligations

incurred since their separation.
6
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s.

That each of the parties be and they are hereby ordered

to assume, pay and discharge their own costs and expenses incurred
in connection herewith, including costs and attorneys fees, without
contribution from the other.
9.

That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the right

to continue as an insured under the Defendant's health and medical
insurance policy in effect through his employer, provided however,
she

shall

be

responsible

for

any

premium charges

associated

therewith.
10.

That each of the parties be and they are hereby ordered

to execute and deliver to the other such deeds,

assignments,

conveyances and bills of sale as each may request from time to time
with respect to the assets awarded to the respective parties,
including those assets which the Court has found and determined to
be separate properties from the marital estate.
DATED this ~ day of January, 1999.

S TO FORM

day of January, 1999.

HA OLD G. CHRISTENSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
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